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INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act' provides the
exclusive remedy for defendants to collaterally
challenge their conviction or sentence. The
Act permits a defendant who is in custody 2 to
seek relief where his conviction or sentence re-
sulted from one or more of the Act's specifi-
cally enumerated errors 3 and the claimed error
has not been waived 4 or previously litigated.
5
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law
of the Pennsylvania State University and author of
the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Act-Practice &
Procedure (2003 ed.).
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9541 et seq.
2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(1).
3 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(2).
4 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§9543(a)(4), 9544(b).
5 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9544(a).
Except for several narrow exceptions, a post-
conviction petition must be filed within one
year of the date that defendant's judgment be-
comes final.6 This article reports on a recent
amendment to the Act, amendments to the
Rules of Criminal Procedure governing post-
conviction relief, and significant decisions of
the Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior
Courts which construe provisions of the Act.
POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING
The PCRA was amended in 2002 to provide
for postconviction DNA testing.7 Under the
amendment, a defendant in custody may seek
DNA testing on available evidence that related
to the investigation or prosecution that re-
sulted in his conviction by filing a written mo-
tion with the sentencing court.8 Where the ev-
idence was discovered prior to the defendant's
conviction, the defendant must establish that
the evidence was not previously subjected to
DNA testing for one of three reasons: (1) the
technology for testing was not in existence at
the time of the trial, (2) defense counsel did
not seek such testing where the verdict was
rendered in the case on or before January 1,
1995, or (3) where the defendant was indigent,
counsel's request for funds to pay for testing
was denied by the court. 9 A motion for DNA
testing must specify the evidence to be tested,
state that the defendant consents to provide
samples of body fluids and contain an ac-
knowledgment that if the motion is granted,
any data obtained from DNA samples or test
results may be entered in law enforcement
databases, used in the investigation of crimes
6 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b).
7 Act of July 10, 2002 (P.L. _, No. 2002-109, 42
Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1 (2002).
8 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(a)(1).
9 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(a)(1).
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and as evidence against the defendant in other
cases.10 In addition, the motion must assert the
defendant's innocence of the crime for which
he was convicted. In capital cases, the defen-
dant must assert actual innocence of the
charged or uncharged conduct that constituted
an aggravating circumstance if the defendant's
exoneration of that conduct would result in
vacating the sentence. Alternatively, the defen-
dant must assert that the outcome of DNA test-
ing would establish a mitigating circumstance
if that mitigating circumstance was presented
at the sentencing hearing and facts related to
that issue were in dispute at the sentencing
hearing." Finally, the motion must present a
prima facie case demonstrating that the iden-
tity or participation of the perpetrator in the
crime was at issue at trial and exculpatory
DNA testing would establish the defendant's
actual innocence of the offense. In a capital
case, the motion must demonstrate defendant's
actual innocence of the charged or uncharged
conduct constituting an aggravating circum-
stance or a mitigating circumstance if the facts
concerning that mitigating circumstance were
at issue at the sentencing hearing.' 2
The court shall order DNA testing if the
above requirements have been satisfied, the
evidence to be tested has not been altered in
any material respect and the motion is made in
a timely manner and not for purposes of de-
lay. 13 Testing may be denied if the court deter-
mines there is no reasonable probability that
the testing would produce exculpatory evi-
dence establishing the defendant's actual in-
nocence or, in a capital case, testing would not
establish the defendant's actual innocence of
the charged or uncharged conduct constituting
an aggravating circumstance or would not es-
tablish a mitigating circumstance. 14 After test-
ing has been completed, the defendant may
petition the court for postconviction relief dur-
ing the 60-day period beginning on the date
on which the defendant is notified of the test
results. 15 The court shall conduct a hearing
on the defendant's motion and determine
10 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(c)(1).
11 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(c)(2).
12 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(c)(3).
"3 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(d)(1). If the defendant is
indigent, costs of the test will be paid by the Com-
monwealth but the testing will be done by the State
Police or by a laboratory selected by the State Police.
42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(e).
14 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(d)(2).
"5 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1().
whether the exculpatory evidence would have
changed the outcome of the trial as required by
§9543(a)(2)(vi) of the Act.16
AMENDMENTS TO RULES GOVERNING
PCRA PROCEEDINGS
Verification and Entry of Appearance
A concern that a petition for postconviction
relief may be filed without the defendant's
authorization prompted an amendment to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 902 governing the content of
the petition for postconviction relief.17 The
amended Rule now requires that in addition to
verifying that the facts set forth in the petition
are true and correct, the defendant must also
verify that the attorney filing the petition is
authorized to act on the defendant's behalf.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 has also been amended to re-
quire that both retained and appointed coun-
sel file a written entry of appearance with the
clerk of court and to serve a copy of the appear-
ance on the attorney for the Commonwealth.
Procedures Governing Petition in Capital Cases
In contrast to the rules governing petitions
for postconviction relief in non-capital cases,
Pa.R.Crim.P. 909 governing capital cases im-
poses time limits on the PCRA court to con-
sider and rule on the defendant's petition. For
several years the Rules Committee considered
various options for addressing a court's non-
compliance with time limits under the Rule.18
An amendment to Rule 909 now permits the
PCRA court one 30-day extension of the re-
quired 90-day time limit. If the PCRA court
fails to comply with the time limits in the
Rule, the Rule requires the clerk of court to
bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme
Court. The comment to the Rule states that
when the PCRA court has not complied with
the time limit, it should provide the Supreme
Court with a written explanation for the delay.
RECENT CASES INTERPRETING THE PCRA
Direct Appeal, Waiver and Ineffectiveness of
Counsel
In Commonwealth v. Grant,19 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court reversed a rule first ar-
16 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(f)(3).
17 32 Pa. Bulletin 1391 (March 16, 2002).
18 See Final Report of the Criminal Procedural
Rules Committee, 32 Pa. Bulletin 1174 (March 2,
2002).
19 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
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ticulated in Commonwealth v. Dancer2e and
later in Commonwealth v. Hubbard21 that
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel be raised
at the first opportunity the defendant is repre-
sented by new counsel. Under the Hubbard
rule, new counsel on direct appeal was re-
quired to raise claims of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel even though the issue was not raised
and developed in the court below. Failure of
new counsel to raise ineffectiveness of trial
counsel resulted in the claims being waived. If
the other requirements of the PCRA were met,
waived claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness
were reviewable in a postconviction proceed-
ing provided the defendant set forth in his pe-
tition a "layered" claim of ineffectiveness, i.e.,
direct appeal counsel was ineffective in failing
to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel and
specifically addressed the three-part ineffec-
tiveness standard as it applied to prior counsel.
In rejecting the Hubbard rule, the court in
Grant noted the numerous problems associ-
ated with identifying and presenting an issue
on appeal that was not considered by the trial
court. The court also noted that with respect to
issues other than ineffectiveness, appellate
courts in Pennsylvania decline to entertain is-
sues raised for the first time on appeal and that
the majority of states and the federal courts
generally defer consideration of ineffective-
ness claims until collateral review. Grant holds
that as a general rule, a defendant "should wait
to raise claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel until collateral review." 22 Ineffective-
ness claims, the court holds, will no longer be
waived because new counsel on direct appeal
did not raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
The court left open the possibility that it may
choose to create an exception to the general
rule and review ineffectiveness claims on di-
rect appeal where the claim involves a "com-
plete or constructive denial of counsel"23 or
where counsel breaches his or her duty of loy-
alty. The court held that its new rule of defer-
ring consideration of claims of trial counsel in-
effectiveness until the collateral review stage
applied retroactively to cases pending on di-
rect appeal where the issue of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness has been raised and preserved.
Grant raises a number of questions. Is the
word "should" in the statement of the rule lim-
ited to the possible exception to the general
20 331 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975).
21 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1977).
22 Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
23 Id. fn. 14.
rule suggested by the court for claims of per se
ineffectiveness 24 or does it have broader mean-
ing? Where raised, can the Superior Court
decide claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness
where the record is adequate to review the
claim?25 If Grant applies in all cases except the
narrow category of per se ineffectiveness
claims, has the court replaced the Hubbard
rule with an equally rigid rule that sacrifices
the prompt resolution of ineffectiveness claims
for the sake of uniformity? While Grant does
not apply where the issue of trial counsel inef-
fectiveness was raised in a timely post-sen-
tence motion 26 and decided by the trial court,
will claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness be
waived if new counsel enters the case at a time
in which the claim could be raised in the trial
court but fails to do so?27 Because of the un-
certainty with respect to what claims of inef-
fectiveness may be resolved on direct appeal
and the risk that a claim may be waived if not
presented, it is likely that direct appeal coun-
sel will continue to raise claims of trial coun-
sel ineffectiveness particularly in cases where
the record would permit the appellate court to
rule on the issue.
There is no discussion by the court in Grant
of ineffectiveness claims in cases where the
defendant receives a non-custodial sentence or
where it is clear that the sentence imposed
will be served by the time direct appeal is con-
cluded.28 In neither case can the defendant
24 The United States Supreme Court has held that
as an exception to the general rule for evaluating
claims of ineffectiveness under Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), where a defendant has
been denied counsel or when the defendant's attor-
ney actively represented conflicting interests, preju-
dice will be presumed. See United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
25 In several post-Grant decisions, the Superior
Court has noted that the Grant rule was stated in
general terms. In Commonwealth v. Rosendaiy, -
A.2d _ (Pa. Super. 2003) the court stated that Grant
"leaves open the propriety of raising a claim on di-
rect appeal of trial counsel's ineffectiveness which is
apparent of record." See also Commonwealth v.
Ruiz, - A.2d _ (Pa. Super. 2003) (noting that
Grant "left open door for creation of exceptions" but
finding record not adequate to review ineffective-
ness claims).
26 Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(a)(iv).
27 See Commonwealth v. JRuiz, _ A.2d ___
(Pa. Super. 2003) (Graci, J., concurring).
28 In his concurring opinion, Justice Saylor notes
that the custody requirement restricts the availabil-
ity of PCRA relief. Grant, 813 A.2d at 741 (Saylor, J.,
concurring).
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seek PCRA relief because the Act requires a de-
fendant to be in custody at the time relief is
granted. 29 In such cases, direct appeal counsel
will continue to present undeveloped claims
of ineffectiveness arguing that to dismiss such
claims under Grant would constitute a denial
of a defendant's right to direct appeal under
Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution.30 If counsel is uncertain whether the
defendant will be eligible for PCRA relief at
the conclusion of direct appeal and, moreover,
believes the undeveloped ineffectiveness
claims are stronger than the preserved issues,
counsel arguably has an obligation to discuss
with the defendant withdrawing the appeal
and pursuing postconviction relief.31 If the di-
rect appeal is withdrawn, the preserved issues
are waived and would be reviewed only in the
form of an ineffectiveness claim of PCRA
counsel on an appeal from the denial of collat-
eral relief.
Finally, by deferring consideration of inef-
fectiveness claims to the postconviction stage,
one consequence of Grant is that for some in-
digent defendants, claims of ineffectiveness
that would otherwise be raised and considered
in the direct appeal process will not be re-
viewed. In contrast to direct appeal where the
defendant is only obligated to communicate to
counsel his wish to appeal, in order for claims
to be reviewed in a postconviction proceeding,
an indigent defendant must file a timely pro se
petition for relief Unlike direct appeal, under
the PCRA a petition must be filed before a
court is authorized to appoint counsel. 32 A de-
fendant's failure to file a timely petition will
result in the ineffectiveness claims being
waived. 33
29 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(1).
30 Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 572
(Pa. 1999).
31 The Superior Court has held that under the
PCRA, a judgment becomes final when a direct ap-
peal is withdrawn. Commonwealth v. Conway, 706
A.2d 1243, 1244 (Pa. Super. 1997).
32 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(a).
33 The time limits in the Act are jurisdictional and
not subject to equitable tolling. Commonwealth v.
Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 2000). Petitions have been
rejected as untimely where the defendant was
placed in a restricted housing unit and was limited
in his ability to gain access to legal materials, Com-
monwealth v. Barrett, 761 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. 2000)
or was unable to file a timely petition because of
mental illness. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 781 A.2d
140 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Pleading Ineffectiveness of Counsel
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Commonwealth v. Grant does
not apply to PCRA cases, as the court noted, it
will eventually eliminate the need for PCRA
counsel in an initial petition to plead a layered
claim of ineffectiveness to avoid a finding that
the claim is waived.3 4 Under the general rule
set out in Grant, the initial postconviction pe-
tition will be the first opportunity to raise
claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness and, as a
result, counsel will no longer be required to
plead underlying trial counsel ineffectiveness
"through the lens of appellate counsel ineffec-
tiveness." 35 But Grant doesn't eliminate lay-
ered claims of ineffectiveness. If PCRA counsel
fails to raise a claim of trial counsel ineffec-
tiveness or a claim that direct appeal counsel
was ineffective in failing to present a claim
other than trial counsel ineffectiveness, the
claim is waived unless the defendant argues
on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief a lay-
ered claim of ineffectiveness. 36 A defendant is
also required to plead a layered claim of inef-
fectiveness assuming a timely second petition
could be filed where PCRA counsel on appeal
fails to raise the ineffectiveness of PCRA coun-
sel's failure to raise the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.
In a number of opinions at the end of 2001,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that
"boilerplate" allegations of prior counsel
ineffectiveness did not rebut the presumption
that prior counsel rendered effective assistance
of counsel.37 In Commonwealth v. (Craig)
Williams, 38 the court stated that PCRA counsel
"must in pleadings and brief, undertake to de-
velop, to the extent possible, the nature of the
claim asserted with respect to each individual
34 Grant, 813 A.2d at 739, n.16.
35 Id.
36 Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 303
n.7 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d
1212, 1216 (Pa. 2002). In Commonwealth v. Jones,
_ A.2d _ (Pa. 2002), the court noted the tension
between permitting a defendant to raise claims on
appeal that were not presented in the initial or
amended PCRA petition and the time limitation gov-
erning the filing of a PCRA petition but declined to
hold that new claims of PCRA ineffectiveness must
be pursued in a second PCRA petition.
37 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivers, 786 A.2d
923, 927 (Pa. 2001), Commonwealth v. Simmons,
804 A.2d 625, 639 (Pa. 2001).
38 782 A.2d 517, 525 (Pa. 2001).
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facet of the layered ineffectiveness claim, in-
cluding that which relates to appellate coun-
sel."' 39 While members of the court have ex-
pressed different views with respect to the
leve of detail required in briefs where the de-
fendant appeals from the denial of PCRA relief
and raises the ineffectiveness of PCRA coun-
sel,40 in order to avoid a finding of waiver,
counsel should fully brief prior counsel's acts
or omissions pursuant to the three-part Pierce/
-Stcldand standard. 41 If the ineffectiveness
claim includes an allegation that PCRA coun-
sel was ineffective in failing to assert the inef-
fectiveness of new counsel on direct appeal
counsel for failing to raise a claim other than
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the defendant's
brief should include argument that the deci-
sion by direct appeal counsel not to raise the
issue was not the result of a rational, strategic
or tactical decision by counsel, that the claim
not presented was clearly stronger than the
claims counsel did present, and if the claim
had been presented, there is a reasonable prob-
ability that the defendant would have pre-
vailed on appeal.42
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent
decision in Commonwealth v. Clayton43 un-
derscores the importance of fully briefing the
claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
The Supreme Court, noting that the defen-
39 Commonwealth v. (Craig) Williams, 782 A.2d at
525.
40 See Commonwealth v. Jones, _ A.2d ___
(Nigro, J., concurring) ("Unlike the majority . . . I
would find that those of appellant's claims that ap-
ply the three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard
as it relates to trial counsel and contains at least a
boilerplate assertion that prior counsel were ineffec-
tive for failing to raise the issue of trial counsel's in-
effectiveness are not waived for purposes of the
PCRA."). See also Commonwealth v. Jones, - A.2d
_ - (Newman, J., concurring) ("While I agree
with the lead opinion that each level of representa-
tion gives rise to distinct claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, and that appellants should recog-
nize this and frame their petitions and briefs
accordingly, nevertheless the court should not im-
pose too onerous a standard on how appellants must
plead these claims in order to obtain substantive re-
view of them.").
41 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa.
1987), Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).
42 Commonwealth v. Jones, - A.2d _ (Pa.
2002).
43 - A.2d - (Pa. 2002).
dant's claims of PCRA ineffectiveness are dis-
tinct from the underlying claims of trial coun-
sel ineffectiveness, denied relief on the
grounds that the defendant had failed to de-
velop in his brief how PCRA counsel's failure
to raise claims of prior counsel's ineffective-
ness lacked a reasonable basis, or "how the
outcome of the PCRA proceeding would have
differed had these claims been advanced .... 44
As a result, the court concluded that the
claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel
were waived.4
5
Ineffectiveness and a Defendant's Right to
Direct Appeal
In Commonwealth v. Eller,46 the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether its decision in Commonwealth v.
Lantzy47 applied retroactively to defendants
whose direct appeal rights were lost due to
counsel's ineffectiveness and nunc pro tunc re-
lief was sought before Lantzy was decided. In
Lantzy, the Supreme Court held that lawyer
error in failing to perfect a direct appeal is a
cognizable claim under the Act. The Supreme
Court stated that an interpretation of the PCRA
to apply only to lawyer error at trial would
lead to a bifurcated system of review having
statutory and common law components that
would be contrary to the Legislature's stated
intent that the PCRA be the "sole means" 48 for
obtaining collateral relief
In two post-Lantzy decisions,49 the Superior
Court held that because Lantzy "overruled
prior case law and announced a new principle
of law,"50 Lantzy did not apply retroactively
and, therefore, defendants who sought relief
44 Commonwealth v. Clayton, - A.2d at .
45 See also Commonwealth v. Jones, _A A2d
(Pa. 2002) (Defendant failed to establish that PCRA
"acted in an objectively unreasonable fashion or that
prejudice ensued."),
46 807 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2002). Prior to Eller, in
Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001),
the court applied Lantzy where nunc pro tunc was
requested before Lantzy was decided. No claim was
made in Hall that applying Lantzy was unlawfully
retroactive.
17 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
48 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9542.
49 Commonwealth v. Hitchcock, 749 A.2d 935 (Pa.
Super. 2000) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Garcia,
749 A.2d 928 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).
50 Commonwealth v. Garcia, 749 A.2d at 932;
Commonwealth v. Hitchcock, 749 A.2d at 938.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
prior to Lantzy were entitled to restoration of
their right to appeal nunc pro tunc outside the
framework of the PCRA.
In Eller, the Supreme Court held that apply-
ing Lan tzy to defendants who sought nunc pro
tunc relief before Lantzy was decided was not
an unlawful application of retroactivity. The
court concluded that Lantzy applied retroac-
tively because it was a construction of the
statute not a new rule of procedure. The court
noted that its decision in Lantzy did not "over-
rule, modify or limit"51 any previous Supreme
Court decision on the issue. In addition, the
court stated that its decision in Lantzy was
premised upon the Court's previous "plain
meaning construction of the exclusivity lan-
guage of §9542"52 of the Act. Because Lantzy
did not create a new rule of law, the Supreme
Court "disapproved '53 of the Superior Court's
decisions that held that Lantzy could not be
applied retroactively. In addition, the court re-
jected Eller's equitable argument that he relied
on the Superior Court's pre-Lantzy holdings in
seeking relief nunc pro tunc outside the frame-
work of the PCRA. The court also rejected his
claim that because PCRA relief would now be
time barred, he would be left without a remedy
to seek restoration of his direct appeal rights.
The fact that the defendant may not have a
remedy, the court stated "cannot warrant the
judicial creation of an extra PCRA remedy for
claims exclusively reserved by the statute."5 4
The court concluded it had no authority to
fashion "ad hoc equitable exceptions to the
PCRA time bar."55 Because the defendant had
not sought collateral relief until more than a
year after his judgment of sentence became
final, his claim was time barred under the Act.
Competency to Pursue Postconviction Relief
and Reinstatement of Postconviction Petition
In a matter of first impression in Pennsylva-
nia, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Haag5 6 addressed the question of whether a
defendant in a capital case must possess some
level of competency in order to pursue post-
conviction relief. In Haag, the PCRA petition
was filed on behalf of the defendant alleging
51 Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d at 844.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 845.
55 Id.
56 809 A.2d 271 (Pa. 2002).
that the defendant was incompetent to pursue
collateral relief. The petition sought the ap-
pointment of the defendant's mother as next
friend. Mental health experts testified that the
defendant did not have an understanding of
his present situation and could not discuss his
case with counsel. Based upon that testimony,
the PCRA court granted the defendant's mother
next friend status. Thereafter, the mother
moved to stay all PCRA proceedings until de-
fendant regained his competence alleging that
next friend remedies were inadequate to pro-
tect the defendant's right to collaterally chal-
lenge his conviction and death sentence. The
PCRA court denied the motion to stay and'or-
dered the next friend to proceed with the
PCRA petition. In affirming the PCRA court's
order denying the stay, the Supreme Court
held that when a defendant is represented by
next friend and counsel, the defendant's "in-
competence is not a bar to effective collateral
review in a death penalty case."'5 7 The court
reasoned that because a putative next friend
must demonstrate that the defendant is incom-
petent in order to have standing as next friend,
the defendant need not be competent for
PCRA proceedings to go forward. Requiring
the next friend to pursue relief while the
defendant is incompetent ensures, the court
stated, that the defendant will benefit
promptly from meritorious claims. The court
concluded that its holding requiring next
friend to proceed with the PCRA did not vio-
late the defendant's right to effective postcon-
viction counsel or his right to due process of
law. Finally, the court noted that if the defen-
dant regains competency after the PCRA pro-
ceeding has been completed and seeks to raise
a cognizable claim that he was unable to com-
municate to counsel because of his incompe-
tency, a second petition raising such a claim
would arguably fall under the newly discov-
ered evidence exception to the Act's one-year
filing period.
In a second case of first impression, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Common-
wealth v. Saranchak58 considered whether a
capital defendant could reinstate his postcon-
viction petition following court-approved
waiver of counsel and withdrawal of the peti-
tion. After the Supreme Court affirmed the
PCRA court's decision that the defendant's
57 Id. at 278.
58 810 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2002).
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withdrawal was knowing and intelligent, the
defendant sought reconsideration of the
Supreme Court's decision and indicated his
desire to retract his waiver and reinstate his
petition for postconviction relief Rejecting the
Commonwealth's argument that reinstatement
relief was not authorized, the court permitted
the postconviction petition to be reinstated
noting the capital nature of the case, the exis-
tence of restraints on serial petitions, the fact
that the Legislature had not addressed the
issue and "the preference for merits review in
capital cases."
59
Application for Stay of Execution
In Commonwealth v. Morris,60 the Supreme
Court set out general guidelines for defendants
and lower courts to follow in requesting and
ruling on an application for stay of execution
under Section 9545(c) of the Act.61 The court
held that a PCRA court is "bound by the re-
quirements of Section 9545 and can only enter
a stay when it has reasonably concluded" that
the requirements set out in the statute are
met. 62 Whether a request for stay is contained
in the petition for PCRA relief or the stay ap-
plication is filed separately, a defendant must
set forth a statement of jurisdiction, a state-
ment, if applicable, that a petition is currently
pending before the court, and a statement
showing a likelihood of prevailing on the mer-
its. The jurisdictional statement must demon-
strate that the petition is timely. Where a stay
application is denied because of failure to
meet the time requirements under the Act, the
defendant must demonstrate on appeal from
the denial of the stay that reasonable jurists
would find it debatable whether the lower
court was correct in its jurisdictional ruling. In
cases where there is not a petition pending, the
defendant will need to demonstrate that there
is an action pending before the court sufficient
to meet the requirements of the section. The
court noted that the "pending" requirement
could be defined more broadly in future
59 Id. at 1200.
60 771 A.2d 721 (Pa. 2001).
61 The court concluded it had jurisdiction to re-
view the stay pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §726. The
court held that §9455(c) governing stays of execu-
tion does not unconstitutionally restrict the defen-
dant's right to appeal or violate the separation of
powers doctrine. Morris, 771 A.2d at 732, 738.
62 Id. at 740.
cases. 63 Finally, the defendant must set forth a
statement demonstrating the likelihood of pre-
vailing on the merits. The court noted that
these requirements must be met before the
lower court reviews the application and that it
is within the trial court's discretion to deter-
mine when the stay application should be con-
sidered. The court noted that a PCRA court can
temporarily enter a stay in order to ensure re-
view of the underlying petition.
Ineffectiveness in Plea Bargaining and
Failure to Assert Rights Under Rules of
Criminal Procedure
In Commonwealth ex. rel. Dadario v. Gold-
berg,64 the defendant sought habeas corpus re-
lief alleging that counsel was ineffective in
failing to advise him of the correct sentencing
guidelines prior to his rejection of the Com-
monwealth's plea bargain. The Superior Court
affirmed the denial of relief on the grounds
that the defendant was not entitled to collat-
eral relief for claims of ineffectiveness in con-
junction with guilty pleas. In reversing the
Superior Court and holding that the defendant
could seek PCRA relief, the Supreme Court
stated that in Commonwealth v. Lantzy6 5 and
Commonwealth v. Chester66 it had rejected a
narrow interpretation of Section 9543(a)(2)(ii)
that would apply only to claims of lawyer er-
ror during trial. The court held that the PCRA
encompasses all claims that the defendant was
denied his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and Article I, Section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. The court noted
that its holding that all constitutionally cog-
nizable claims of ineffectiveness of counsel
may be reviewed in the PCRA proceeding
avoids a bifurcated system of review in which
some claims would be reviewed outside the
framework of the PCRA.
The Superior Court relied on Dadario in two
decisions involving the failure of counsel to
assert defendant's rights under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In Commonwealth v.
Padden,67 the defendant alleged counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to sentencing be-
yond the time mandated by former Rule 1405,
now Rule 704. The Superior Court reversed
the trial court's denial of relief on the grounds
63 Morris, 771 A.2d at 741, n.20.
64 773 A.2d 127 (Pa. 2001).
65 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
66 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999).
67 783 A.2d 299 (Pa. Super. 2001).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
that a delay in sentencing did not implicate
the "truth determining process" under Section
9543(a)(2)(ii) of the Act. The Superior Court
concluded that based upon Dadario, counsel's
failure to object to the fact that the defendant
was not sentenced within the required time
period was a cognizable claim under the
PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Prout,68 the
Superior Court likewise concluded that the de-
fendant's ineffectiveness claim based upon ap-
pellate counsel's failure to raise a prompt trial
claim under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (formerly Rule
1100) constituted a cognizable claim under
Dadario.
Second or Subsequent Petition Considered as
First Petition
Various panels of the Superior Court have
considered the issue of whether a second or
subsequent petition that is time barred under
the Act can be considered as an extension of
the initial timely petition where appointed
counsel's omissions precluded review of the
claims presented. 69 The issue has been consid-
ered again by the Superior Court in three re-
cent cases.
In Commonwealth v. Kubis,70 PCRA counsel
failed to address the apparent untimeliness of
defendant's petition and the lower court dis-
missed the initial petition as untimely. While
counsel sent the defendant a letter notifying
him of his right to appeal, because the defen-
dant had been transferred to another prison he
did not receive the letter and, therefore,
missed the appeal deadline. The lower court
permitted the defendant to appeal nunc pro
tunc. In reversing the PCRA court and holding
that defendant's appeal constituted a second
68 814 A.2d 693 (Pa. Super. 2002).
69 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leasa, 759 A.2d
941, 942 (Pa. Super. 2000); Commonwealth v.
Peterson, 756 A.2d 687, 689 (Pa. Super. 2000).
70 808 A.2d 196 (Pa. Super. 2002), petition for al-
lowance of appeal denied, _ A.2d _ (Pa. 2002).
petition, and not a continuation of his first pe-
tition, the Superior Court distinguished its de-
cisions in Commonwealth v. Leasa7l and
Commonwealth v. Peterson7 2 as cases where
counsel's ineffectiveness waived defendant's
claims for relief. In Kubis, the court concluded
that counsel did not abandon the defendant on
appeal and that his failure to address the ap-
parent untimeliness of the petition did not
waive any of the substantive claims presented
in the petition. The Superior Court therefore
treated the nunc pro tunc appeal as a second
petition and dismissed it as untimely.
Kubis was distinguished in Commonwealth
v. Williams.73 In Williams, the Superior Court
treated the defendant's second and untimely
petition as a continuation of his first petition
where counsel appointed to represent him in
his first petition had previously represented
the Commonwealth in the same case.
In Commonwealth v. Ceo,74 the defendant
timely filed a first petition seeking reinstate-
ment nunc pro tunc of his right to direct ap-
peal. Although the PCRA court granted the re-
lief, counsel failed to file the appeal. In
response to second and third petitions, the
PCRA court granted the defendant the right to
file a direct appeal but in each case, new coun-
sel failed to file a brief and the appeal was dis-
missed. In response to the defendant's fourth
petition seeking the same relief, the PCRA
court dismissed the petition as untimely. The
Superior Court concluded that the defendant
was entitled to reinstatement nunc pro tunc of
his right to direct appeal. The court held that
where the defendant files a timely petition but
omissions of counsel preclude the defendant
from receiving the relief sought, second or sub-
sequent petitions that would be otherwise
time-barred are properly considered an exten-
sion of the first petition.
71 759 A.2d 941, 942 (Pa. Super. 2000).
72 756 A.2d 687, 689 (Pa. Super. 2000).
73 814 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 2002).
74 812 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. 2002).
